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TRIBUTE TO
PROFESSOR MELVYN R.
DURCHSLAG
EXPLORING THE AFFECTIVE
CONSTITUTION
Kathryn A bramst
I'm delighted to have this opportunity to pay tribute to the work
and career of Mel Durchslag. You have a wonderful tradition for
celebrating faculty retirements, but it creates a paradoxical situation
for the speaker: I'm here to honor a man that I've only recently had
the pleasure of meeting, and to celebrate his career before a group of
people who have known and valued him for decades. This is no small
order. But I think the least presumptuous way to offer this kind of
tribute is to talk a bit about Mel as he is reflected in his scholarly
work-the Mel who leaps out of the pages of law reviews. Those of
you on the faculty can supplement this, in your own minds, with your
own knowledge of Mel as a colleague and human being. Then I'd like
to pay a more indirect tribute, by talking about some work that
tHenna Hill Kay Distinguished Professor of Law, UC-Berkeley School of Law. I want
to thank Gary Simson and, of course, Mel Durchslag, for giving me the occasion to develop
these ideas, and the faculty of Case Western Reserve University School of Law for their
hospitality and their thought-provoking questions. I would also like to thank Reva Siegel, Pam
Karlan, Priscilla Smith, and participants in the Stanford Roundtable on Reproductive Rights for
prompting me to think through the affective implications of Gonzalez v. Carhart. Finally, I am
grateful to Hila Keren, Jack Jackson, and Robert Tsai for generative conversations on the topic
of this Article. This Article was originally developed as a lecture to honor the retirement of
Professor Melvyn R. Durchslag in April 2008.
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combines a recent interest of mine, in the role of emotion in law, with
a longstanding interest of Mel's, in the Constitution.
One of the most interesting parts of preparing this lecture has been
having the opportunity to spend some time with Mel's work. When I
first started reviewing his body of articles, I was amazed to find that
one person had written in so many different doctrinal areas. I have a
high threshold to this kind of variety because I've had a somewhat
peripatetic scholarly life myself, but this was really something-
Eleventh Amendment immunity, constitutional welfare rights,
federalism and the Commerce Clause, individual rights, voting rights,
even local government law, and taxation. And all of it both tightly
and imaginatively argued: to take one example, I've taught Shaw v.
Reno'- case in which Mel and I both have an interest and which I'll
be discussing later-for years in my voting rights class, but it never
occurred to me to compare it with Batson v. Kentucky.2 it did,
however, occur to Mel, and, as a result, I learned a new way of
thinking about the harm the Court sought to identify in Shaw. So Mel
sets a high bar for legal argumentation, one I only hope I can meet in
my comments today. What I'd like to do is to pursue Mel's interest in
constitutional law, through the lens provided by recent work on "law
and the emotions." Exploring the "affective Constitution" seems like
an appropriate way to honor someone who's been described to me, by
many of his colleagues, as being the "heart" of this institution.
1. LAW AND THE EMOTIONS: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
It may be useful to begin with an overview of legal scholarship
relating to the emotions. Hila Keren and I have described legal
scholars' investigation of the role of emotion in the law as proceeding
in three phases.4 In the first phase of this scholarship, theorists argued
about whether there could be or should be a role for emotion in law.5
This body of scholarship confronted the assumption that the law is a
domain of rationality, whose decision-makers strive for objectivity in
all that they do.6 Scholars interested in the emotions either challenged
1509 U.S. 630 (1993).
2 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
3For a description of this body of work, see Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who's
Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94 Minn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010). See also Susan A.
Bandes, Introduction to THE PASSIONS OF LAW I (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999); Terry A.
Maroney, Law and Emotions: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 30 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 119 (2006).
4 Abrams & Keren. supra note 3 (manuscript at Part 1).
5Id. (manuscript at Part LA).
6 See, e.g., Angela P. Harris & Marjorie M. Shultz, "A(nother) Critique of Pure
Reason ": Toward Civic Virtue in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1773 (1993); Lynne N.
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these assumptions outright, or explained how the operation of
emotion in law could be reconciled with them.7 As this challenge
began to gain credibility-a task that is still ongoing with respect to
the legal mainstream-law and emotions scholars turned to a second
focus of inquiry: they began to investigate the specific emotions they
saw as being involved in particular areas of law. In this work, legal
scholars drew on research from other disciplines to ask, for example,
how we should understand disgust, remorse, or vengeance, and they
began to trace the operation of these emotions in certain legal areas,
such as the criminal law. 8
More recently, some legal scholars interested in the emotions have
initiatCd a third Ind of inquiry: they have begun to consider the
normative consequences of recognizing the interrelation of emotions
and the law.9 They've begun to ask what we should do with this
knowledge we've gained about the emotions in relation to law: can it
help us understand how the law works, or (more importantly) how it
might work better? This might mean using our understanding of the
emotions to improve the operation of legal doctrine. Or, in a more
ambitious vein, it might mean reforming or restructuring the law in
order to produce particular emotional effects by ameliorating specific
negative emotions, for example, or fostering positive ones. This is
not, I should add, quite as radical as it may sound. Martha Minow has
written about how criminal tribunals or truth commissions might be
used to mitigate vengeance or cultivate reconciliation in the wake of
mass violence.'0 Cass Sunstein has explored how law might be used
to respond to fear."
Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574, 1596-1607, 1612-17 (1987);
Martha L. Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10 CARDozo L. REv. 37
(1988); Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our
Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1877 (1988).
7See sources cited supra note 6.
8 See, eg., Martha C. Nussbaum, "The Secret Sewers of Vice ": Disgust, Bodies, and the
Law, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 3, at 19; Dan M. Kahan, The Progressive
Appropriation of Disgust, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 3, at 70.
9See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Law in the Cultivation of Hope, 95 Cal. L.
Rev. 319 (2007); Clare Huntington, Repairing Family Law, 57 DUKE L.J. 1245 (2008); Solangel
Maldonado, Cultivating Forgiveness: Reducing Hostility and Conflict After Divorce, 43 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 441 (2008); Clare Huntington, Happy Families? Translating Positive
Psychology into Family Law, 16 VA. J. Soc POL'Y & L. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript on file
with author); Hila Keren, Giving is Receiving, The Emotions Which Make it Rational to
Enforce Promises to Gift (March 1, 2009, unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
10 MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998).
'CASS R. SIJNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005).
2009] 573
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11. THE ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
You can see these different strands of inquiry at issue in the
constitutional arena, and I want to touch briefly on each in my
comments. First, I will explore the ways that emotion might be
implicated in the field of constitutional law. Then I will identify some
of the emotions that have played a particularly prominent role in
recent constitutional analysis; and finally I will suggest how fuller
understanding of these emotions might enhance constitutional
decision-making. In conclusion, I will consider why it may be useful
to think in this unaccustomed way about constitutional law. I want to
add that while I may make some claims that seem strong, these ideas
are actually quite provisional. Although I've thought a fair amount
about the emotions in law, I'm just beginning to think about how
becoming more alert to their role might affect the field of
constitutional law in particular. So emboldened by Mel's own
example of moving energetically into new areas, I will lay out these
ideas, not in hopes of making conclusive pronouncements, but with
the goal of starting a broader conversation about these questions.
A. Emotion in Constitutional Decision-Making
1. As an Attribute of the Decisionmaker
Let's start with the first level of inquiry: does affect, and should
affect, play a role in constitutional decision-making? It's fair to say
that there's been a rather schizoid history in this area. On the one
hand, there are many factors that would seem to make emotion
anathema in the crucial area of constitutional decision-making.
Constitutional law is an area in which decision-makers
(paradigmatically, judges) are oriented to a specific text, and situated
within a specific history-all of which might seem to make emotion
an extraneous and therefore inappropriate influence. Constitutional
law is also high stakes stuff: in this context-as compared to the
average lawsuit-courts are interpreting the highest law of the
land, and decisions at the appellate and Supreme Court levels will
resolve cases throughout the federal system. When you add to this the
counter-majoritarian difficulty-the prospect that judicial
interpretation of this document may invalidate the work of the
democratically-elected legislature t2-there seems to be a particularly
12 This difficulty received its paradigmatic articulation in ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). It has
spawned literally shelves of commentary and efforts at resolution by constitutional scholars.
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acute need for the paradigmatic judicial virtues of objectivity (in the
sense of distance or dispassion) and rationality, which also seems to
militate against emotion. There's finally a matter of history here: it is
possible to ar Tue, as Doni Gerwirtzman has done in an excellent
recent article,' that the Framers of the Constitution were extremely
wary of emotion, and that we can understand many of the
constitutional structures that endure to this day as vehicles for
subjecting the dangerously hot or volatile emotions to the cooler
influence of reason.
But while legal scholars may see the constitutional field as
ill-suited to the exploration of the emotions, some leading jurists have
seen matters differently. Justice Brennan, in a fascinating lecture,
described the way that his decision in Goldberg v. Kelly'14 was
informed not just by his reason, but by his passions.' 5 He observed
that the plaintiffs' brief had generated an empathic response in him by
describing the plaintiffs' lives and predicament in palpable, human
terms.'16 This lecture generated a lot of controversy, and prompted
some legal scholars, most famously Owen Fiss,'17 to jump in and try
to save Justice Brennan from himself, suggesting that he had
misconstrued the grounds of his own decision. But this revelation
created an illuminating crack in the facade of the Court's rationality.
Additional light was shed on this affective dimension of adjudication
by Justice Blackmun, exclaiming about the plight of Joshua
DeSheney' 8 and alluding to the emotional as well as the political
stakes of the Court's abortion decisions,' 9 and even by Justice Scalia,
See, e.g., IBRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS]; 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS
(1998); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980);
Barry Friedman, The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the Pathology of Constitutional
Scholarship, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 933 (2001).
13 Doni Gewirtzman, Our Founding Feelings: Emotion, Commitment, and Imagination in
Constitutional Culture, 43 U. RICH. L. REv. 623 (2009).
14 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
"5 William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason. Passion, and "The Progress of the Law," 10
CARDozo L. REV. 3, 19-22 (1988).
16 Idat 21.
17 Owen M. Fiss, Reason in All Its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 789, 799 (1990).
18 DeSheney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible,
bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned by respondents who placed him in a
dangerous predicament and who knew or learned what was going on, and yet did essentially
nothing except . . . 'dutifully recorded these incidents in [their] files."' (citation omnitted)
(brackets in original)).
19 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 943 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting his age and how his impending retirement
would play in the abortion debate).
2009] 575
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demonstrating passion as well as rationality in his jousting with
judicial colleagues.2
The role of emotion in constitutional decisionaking has also
been underscored by a recent body of scholarship that describes
constitutional interpretation or lawmaking as extending beyond the
work of courts. Scholars including Bruce Ackerman,'2 1 Larry
Kramer,2  Reva Siegel,2  and Robert Pose24 have sought to describe
constitutional lawmaking as encompassing a complex conversation
between the courts, the elected branches, and the people. In this form
of exchange, emotion is no longer suspect; in Ackerman's work, for
example, the heightened emotional valence of the public response
helps to signal to the Court that an exceptional turn in politics
germane to constitutional interpretation is occurring. As the scope of
constitutional meaning-making expands to include legislators and the
public, the demand for dispassion in constitutional decisionmaking
eases, and emotion finds a more legitimate, and a more central role.2
2. As a Dimension of Persuasion
The above analysis, however, describes only one way that emotion
may become germane to constitutional lawmaking-as an attribute of
the decisionmaker. It may also be implicated as a part of the
persuasion that occurs in the realm of constitutional argumentation.
We've already seen, in Justice Brennan's discussion of Goldberg v.
Kelly, an example in which advocates cultivated the emotion of
empathy in order to encourage a particular kind of resolution. But
persuasion can run two ways: the Court can also mobilize emotion in
the effort to persuade its readers-be they the legal community or the
broader public. Sometimes emotion can be a potent vehicle for
20 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 566 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
21 AcKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 12.
22 LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
23 Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional
Change: The Case of the defacto ERA, 94 CAL L. REV. 1323 (2006).
24 Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People:
Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003).
25 After offering this hypothesis in my original lecture, I was fascinated to see it
developed at great length, and in a slightly different direction, by Doni Gewirtzman. See
Gewirtzman, supra note 13. Gewirtzman goes farther than I do here, in arguing that the salutary
role of the emotions, in fostering commitment and imagination-two key components of
constitutionalism-militate in favor of allowing a larger role for popular constitutionalismi,
perhaps even questioning the primacy of judicial decisionnsaking in the constitutional area. Id.
Because I believe that affective understandings can be deployed to advantage by judges as well
as lay citizens, I do not necessarily see the role of the emotions as reshaping claims of
comparative institutional advantage in the constitutional area.
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introducing a new constitutional understanding, or highlighting the
need for it.
In Shaw v. Reno, for example, the Court sought to extend its
restrictive affirmative action jurisprudence to majority-minority
electoral districts created under the Voting Rights Act.2 The voting
rights area had been one of the few in which race-conscious remedies
had enjoyed comparatively wide support-partly because of the long
history of frank and violent denial of the African-American vote, and
partly because of the explicitly race-conscious character of the Voting
Rights Act (the preclearance provision, Section 5, that was at issue in
Shaw, in particular).2 Shaw held for the first time that the imposition
of a race-conscilous remedy in thc voting rights area can create a
28claim of constitutional violation. Because it may have suspected that
the public was not entirely prepared for this transition, the Court
renders the opinion in particularly florid, metaphorical language,
which, it seems to me, is designed to incite indignation 29in readers-
26 509 U.S. 630 (1993). Shaw concerned the efforts of the state of North Carolina to create
a congressional districting arrangement that met the preclearance requirements of section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 634. Directed by the Voting Rights division of the Justice
Department to create an additional district that gave African-Americans the opportunity to elect
the candidates of their choice, id. at 635, North Carolina rejected the most obvious suggestion
about where to place this district, becausc it would have created problems for one or more
incumbents. Instead it situated the district in an area that did not have a geographically compact
population of African-Americans. Consequently, state officials were obliged to draw an
irregularly shaped district, which drew into its ambit a series of black neighborhoods located in
a long, narrow strip along highway 1-85. Id at 635-36. As one legislator said .....[i]f you drove
down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district .""'. Id.
at 636 (quoting Joan Biskupic, N.C. Case to Pose Test of Racial Redistricting- White Voters
Challenge Black-Majority Map, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1993, at A4) (brackets in original).
White voters in the district challenged its creation under the Equal Protection Clause, arguing
that the evident efforts to classify voters according to race violated their equal protection right to
participate in a color-blind electoral process. Id. at 637. The Court held that such a claim might
state a violation under the Equal Protection Clause, id. at 658, although it did not definitively
articulate the elements necessary to establish such a claim.
27 See 42 U.S.C §§ 1973 1973aa6. Section 5, § 1973c, prohihits a covered jurisdiction
from implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting"
without seeking and receiving authorization from the Voting Rights Division of the Department
of Justice or a District Court for the District of Columbia. Id. § 1973c(a). The race
consciousness of this provision inheres importantly in the fact that those jurisdictions that are
'1covered" under Section 5 are states and counties within states that have a particularly egregious
history of discrimination against African Americans or other racial and language minorities
protected by the Act in the area of voting. The formula originally used to determine which
jurisdictions would be covered targets jurisdictions that used poll taxes or similar exclusionary
practices, and in which less than half of the minority population was registered to vote. See 42
U.S.C. § 1973c.
28 See Shaw, 509 U,S. at 63 9-52.
29 Indignation has been explored at some length by Martha Nussbaum who describes it as
anger at a perceived wrong that has been done to you, or another. See Nussbaum, supra note 9,
at 19. Indignation has a contagious quality that is not characteristic of all emotions: if your
friend feels indignant at a wrong someone else has done her, you are likely to feel indignant as
well; whereas if she feels love for a third party, you are not likely to share that emotion.
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black and white-who might not intuitively grasp the harmi of such a
district. It begins by analogizing the challenged district to the
"'uncouth twenty-eight-'sided figure"'.30 that disenfranchised the
blacks of Tuskegee, Alabama in Gomillion v. Ligh tfoot,3 1 noting that
"[ilt is unsettling how closely [this district] 3resembles the most
egregious racial gerrymanders of the past."32 Thus, the aroused
sentiment that readers had been prepared to direct toward the
opponents of African-American enfranchisement is swiftly displaced
onto the state actors who have sought to respond to this scourge. The
opinion continues by referring to the effort to comprehend a majority
of Blacks within a particular electoral district as "political
apartheid" 33 -the contemporary term perhaps most strongly
associated with a sense of indignation at undeserved political
exclusion or subordination. And it describes the assumption behind
the challenged district as a flawed, potentially insulting suggestion
that one could find political commonality among a group of people
who "have little in common with one another but the color of their
skin.",34 The case uses particularly blunt affective appeals-from
heavy-handed metaphorical language to freighted historical
analogies-to re-script the indignation of the American public and to
shift it from cases like Gomillion to cases like Shaw, from the harm of
racial disadvantage in voting to the harm of race-based electoral
classification.3
Nussbaum likes indignation as a basis for legal action because it can be connected with the
giving of reasons: indeed, Aristotle's Rhetoric explained how a speaker can engender
indignation in an audience by giving them reasons to believe that a wrong had been done. Id at
26. But there is also a potentially unreliable quality to indignation, which some philosophers
describe as connected with the love of money or honors or possessions. Because we may want
these things, or even feel entitled to them, we feel indignation when they are denied us. When
our desire for honor or material goods is excessive, our indignation may be excessive or
unwarranted as well.
30 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 640 (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960)).
31 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
32 Id at 64 1.
33 Id at 647.
34 Id
31 By framing the substantive right at issue as an abstract claim to be deprived of
the "right to participate in a 'color-blind' electoral political process," id at 641-42, the
Court confers a final gift on prospective claimants: it penmits them to feel indignant about
race-conscious electoral arrangements without having to raise arguments about their own
group-based electoral disadvantage. Not only does this make the case easier to prove
doctrinally-even as it makes the claimants' standing, as Mel has observed, a bit peculiar-but
it also permits prospective claimants to experience indignation on behalf of the population as a
whole, without feeling that they are focusing on their own parochial advantage.
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3. As an Object of Constitutional Adjudication
Emotion might also be understood in a final way: as an object of
constitutional adjudication.
a. As a Goal of Constitutional Structure
At the most general level, the Constitution may be understood as
creating institutional structures that serve to manage or channel (or
generally "cool") emotion. The Framers may have worried about the
role of unconstrained emotions in constitutional governance, but their
answer was neither to ignore them36 nor to suppress them .37 The
Framers saw the domain of politics and government as being fraught
with emotion, but they also viewed the institutional arrangements
created by the Constitution as being vehicles for managing it, or
rendering it productive. Take, for example, those minorities and
majorities "actuated by some common impulse of passion, 38 in
Federalist No. 10, or the perpetually overreaching ambitions of the
constitutional officeholders in Federalist No. 51 .39 The Framers
believed that emotion was best controlled or properly directed when it
was answered by a distinct or competing emotion, and they used the
Constitution to structure this kind of engagement between emotions-
factions competing for popular support across an extended sphere,
ambition counteracting ambition in the system of checks and
balances.
b. As a Backdrop to Constitutional Interpretation
Emotion is also the object of constitutional adjudication in the
sense that it can provide the backdrop for, or the subtext of, the
controversies that courts and other constitutional decisionmakers are
required to resolve. Although emotions may not be explicitly
implicated in the doctrinal issues before the court, they are very much
present in the minds of judges or justices as they work toward a
36 In this sense, the Framers made discussion of and inquiry into emotion a legitimate
topic for constitutional analysis from the earliest days of constitutional history, and our habitual
reluctance to think about constitutional matters in this way is s departure from their salutary
example.
37 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 43 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992)
(stating that suppressing faction-an lmportant seat of emotion in the Federalist Papers-would
be a cure "worse than the disease").
38 Id.
39 THE FEDERALIST No. 5 1, at 262-63 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992)
("Ambition must be made to counteract ambition..the constant aim is to divide and arrange
the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other; that the private
interest of every individual, may be a centinel over the public rights.").
2009] 579
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resolution. The fear that possessed the nation after 9/11 is very much
the subtext of the detention cases that followed-much as the fuiry
and indignation that fueled massive resistance to school desegregation
formed the backdrop to Cooper v. Aaron 4 0 and the anger that led to
Mr. Cohen's famous jacket concerning the Vietnam draft set the stage
for Cohen v. California.4
c. As an Explicit Focus of Constitutional Interpretation
Finally, and perhaps more importantly, emotion may become an
object or focus of constitutional adjudication because specific norms
embodied in the Constitution-norms articulated in the document, or
in the adjudication that gives it meaning-have crucial affective
dimensions. This may mean that the Court looks to that affective
dimension to explain the wrong that the Constitution aims to prevent
(or the value it aims to vindicate), or it may use the presence or
absence of that affective state to decide when a violation has
occurred. The Court's discussion of the damage to the "hearts and
minds" of Black children, perpetrated by segregated primary and
secondary schools, may be an example of this kind of use of
42 teCemotion, as is teCurt's recognition that the First Amendment
protects emotive as well as cognitive dimensions of speech in Cohen
v. California.4 The Eighth Amendment's text proscribing the use of
"cruel and unusual punishment"". invites recourse to affective states,
as emotions provide a visceral clue to what we find to be "cruel."
Similarly, Rochin v. California's focus on "conduct that shocks the
cosineA 5 instructs decisionmakers to consult their outrage or
indignation. More recently, women's fear, guilt, and regret have
become the subject of explicit deliberation as the Court has weighed
restrictions on the right to reproductive choice.4
- 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
41 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
42 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) ("To separate (Black children]
from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone.").
43 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26 ("[Wjords are often chosen as much for their emotive as their
cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the
cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which,
practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall message sought to
be communicated.").
44 U.S. CONST., amend. Vill.
45 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
46 The Court has considered fear in the context of spousal notification provisions. See
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893-94 (1992). The briefs filed in
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), also include lengthy discussions of guilt and regret.
See, e.g., Brief of Sandra Cano, The Former "Mary Doe" of Doe v. Bolton, and 180 Women
580 Vol. 59:3
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B. The Emotions of Constitutional Law: Two Examples
There is, at least in theory, no limit to the range of emotions that
could become salient in constitutional law. Which emotions claim the
attention of the courts at any given time depends, in the first instance,
on what constitutional provisions are being adjudicated. As we saw
above, shame or humiliation might be an index of subordination in
the context of equal protection litigation, while vengeance and mercy
might be at issue in the context of the death penalty. Different
emotions may also form the backdrop for the Court's decision-
making, either because they comprise the political backdrop for
certain decisions, or because the tenor of the Court's decision-making
over a period of time is marked by the influence of a particular
emotion. Lynne Henderson has described, for example, the increasing
salience of empathy in the jurisprudence of the Warren Court, and its
eclipse in the years of the Burger Court.4 For purposes of this
discussion, I will focus on two emotions that have become important
in the Supreme Court jurisprudence of the last several years: fear,
which has been a prominent backdrop to a number of cases on
detention and national security, and regret, which has become an
explicit focus of constitutional analysis in cases involving abortion. I
will first describe the way these emotions have been implicated in two
recent Supreme Court cases, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 18 and Gonzales v.
Carhart . I will then explore some of the things we have learned
about these emotions from cross-disciplinary analysis, and ask how
understanding more about these emotions might aid adjudication.
1. Fear
The first emotion I will consider is fear. Fear is one of the most
familiar, and most thoroughly analyzed, of emotions:" It has a
Injured by Abortion as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 22-24, Carhart, 550 U.S. 124
(No. 05-380), 2006 WVL 1436684 [hereinafter Brief of Sandra Cano]. I have chosen to focus on
regret below because it is specifically referenced in the Court's opinion in Carhart, and because,
unlike guilt, it does not have a complicated history on the criminal "side" of the law.
47 See Henderson, supra note 6.
48 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
49 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
50 This rich literature analyzes fear both as a more intuitive manifestation of affect and as
a more cognitively inflected process of risk perception and assessment. See, e.g., J.H. BAMBER,
THE FEARS OF ADOLESCENTS (1979); JOSEPH LEDoux, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE
MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL LIFE (1996); SUNSTEIN, supra note 11;
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic &
Amos Tversky eds., 1999); George Loewenstein & Jane Mather, Dynamic Processes in Risk
Perception. 3 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 155 (1990); Robert Zajonc, On the Primacy of Affect, 39
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recognizable visceral component that is well described, for example,
in the work of legal scholar William Miller: increased pulse,
trembling, sweating, in extreme cases incontinence, an adrenaline
charged "fight or flight" response that can, for example, lead soldiers
to drop their weapons and run headlong from the site of battle .5'1 But it
also has its less bodily, less instinctive, more cognitive moments: it
has been described by Cass Sunstein as a judgment made by an
individual, or a group, that we are danger.5 This judgment may
prompt an instinctive reaction, or in many collective contexts
(including legal contexts) it may prompt discussion and reflection
about how and through what instrumentalities we should respond to
that danger.
Fear has been the spoken or unspoken backdrop in a range of
pivotal periods of constitutional decisiontmaking. A fear of the impact
of the faction on "aggregate interests," such as security in one's
private property, may have infused the structural choices of the
Framers, such as the decision in favor of an "extended sphere" for the
new Union.5 Fear for the future of the Union defined the subtext of
cases such as Dred Scott v. Sandford. 14 The fear that gripped the
nation following the attack on Pearl Harbor prompted the exaggerated
deference of the Court's decision in Korematsu v. United States. 5
Fear has been invoked at other moments because of its rhetorical
power-to unify' or to focus attention on an insufficiently
acknowledged threat. In the Supreme Court's struggle over
reproductive choice, both pro-choice and pro-life Justices have
mobilized fear to rally readers to their particular viewpoint: Justice
Scalia raising the spectre of a politicized judicial process, with
throngs marching on the mall outside the Supreme Court,5 and
Justice Blackmun invoking the "chill wind" that threatens to blow
through women's reproductive futures." Yet in few periods have
Am. PSYCHOL. 117 (1984).
51 See William Ian Miller, Fear, Weak Legs, and Running Away: A Soldier's Story, in THE
PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 3, at 241.
52 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 3.
53 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 54 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992). A line
of analysis extending back to CHARLES AUSTIN BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913), finds the Framers to be motivated by the
desire to protect existing property relations.
54 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), implicitly overruled by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, as
recognized in Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
55 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
56 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979-1002 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
57 See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 560 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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constitutional decisionmakers wrestled as palpably with a fear shared
with the entire citizenry as in the constitutional cases on the rights of
detainees following 9/11.
One way that the Executive Branch has responded to this fear was
to begin a practice of indefinite detention of those suspected of
perpetrating, or collaborating with the perpetrators of, terrorist
attacks. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld was one case that challenged this
practice,5 and a brief examination will illustrate the role that fear has
played in this kind of case. The Hamdi case asked when the
government is authorized to hold detainees, and whether and through
what kind of recourse detainees may challenge this practice, under the
Due Process Clause or other constitutional provisions.5 9 If that was
the specific legal question raised by the case, the broader question
before the Court-and the question with affective dimensions-was
how the institutional arrangements that comprise our governmental
system, should respond to the fear aroused by these attacks. The
Court delivered what has come to be its customary array of four very
different opinions. The majority (a plurality of Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Breyer joined on the determinative issue by Justices
Souter and Ginsburg) held that the detainee, Hamdi, was entitled to
some version of due process, under the doctrine of Mathews v.
Eldridge,6 to determine whether he was being wrongfully held as an
"enemy combatant. 6
How did these opinions address the emotion of fear? The four
opinions envision different responses, reflected in different
institutional arrangements. For three of the four, our form of
government neither rejects fear nor accepts it at face value. Instead,
governmental arrangements subject fear-in this case embodied in
the practice of indefinite detention-to a series of institutional
checks .62 These checks permit governmental actors to assess fear's
relation to the extant threat, and to make sure that it doesn't
58 Hamndi v. Runssfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004).
59 Id at 509 ("At this difficult time in our nation's history, we are called upon to consider
the legality of the Government's detention of a United States citizen on United States soil as an
,enemy combatant' and to address the process that is constitutionally owed to one who seeks to
challenge his classification as such.").
-424 U.S. 319 (1976).
61 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529-35.
62 For discussions of the institutional checks that constrain executive power in the
detention of "enemy combatants," see id. at 521, 533 (discussing requirements of congressional
authorization and due process, respectively, in plurality opinion); id. at 554 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the role of the Suspension Clause in the context of war in a dissenting
opinion joined by Justice Stevens); id at 542 (Souter, J1., concurrng in part and dissenting in
part) (discussing requirement of, and reasons for, explicit legislative authorization of detention
of enemy combatants in an opinion joined by Justice Ginsburg).
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overwhelm other interests or values that might not have the same
immediacy to decisionmakers in the moment, such as empathy with,
or concern for, the civil rights-indeed the humanity-of those
detained.6 One vehicle for performing this institutional assessment is
the system of checks and balances. Indeed, eight out of nine Justices
emphasize the agreement of more than one branch as a factor that
serves to justify the indefinite detention of enemy combatants. While
the plurality reserves the question whether such agreement is
required, it emphasizes that the detention was authorized by
Congressional enactment of the AUMF. Justices Ginsburg and Souter
contend that an Executive's decision to detain must in the first
instance be authorized by Congress;64 Justices Scalia and Stevens
argue that the Executive must charge or release detainees unless
Congress suspends the writ of habeas corpus. 65 Each of these opinions
also allows for judicial review as to whether these requirements have
been met. 6 Only Justice Thomas contends that the Executive has a
distinctive institutional competence to address national security fears,
and, consequently, that other branches, including the Court, should
defer.6 Five Justices also require a second kind of check on fear: they
require an alleged enemy combatant to be able to challenge that status
by recourse to a hearing-a guarantee of due process-even under
such exigent circumstances.6 This brings the Court into the ultimate
determination of whether national security fears should prevail in a
63 See id. at 532 (plurality opinion) ("it is during our most challenging and uncertain
moments that our nation's commitment to Due Process is most severely tested; and it is at those
times that we must preserve our commitment at home to those values for which we fight
abroad.").
64 The plurality appears to reserve the question whether the executive could detain without
congressional authorization, basing its opinion instead on the governments "alternative"
position: that Congress had in fact authorized the detention in this case under the AUMF. Id. at
516-17. Ginsburg and Souter, on the other hand, explicitly require congressional authorization,
based on their interpretation of the Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), which bars
imprisonment or detention of a citizen ..'except pursuant to an Act of Congress."' Id at 542
(Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)) ("[T]he
prohibition within § 4001(a) has to be read broadly to accord the statute a long reach and to
impose a burden of justification on the Government."). Ginsburg and Souter observe, however,
that they view this act as consistent with the broader scheme of separation of powers embodied
in the Constitution. See id at 545.
65 Id. at 554-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66 See id at 524 (plurality opinion) (reserving the question of specifically what process is
due but defining a minimum that is applicable in this context, and holding that it is not met by
the Government's proposed approach); id at 573, 576 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the
Court may determine whether Congress has suspended the writ of habeas corpus, but may not
itself suspend writ); id at 545 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding it to
be the Court's responsibility to identify a clear statement of congressional authorization for the
holding of enemy combatants with the specificity required by Section 4001, and determining
that none of the Government's arguments in favor of such a clear authorization is satisfactory).
67 Id at 579-99 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
68 See id. at 524-39 (plurality opinion) (discussing due process).
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particular case. Justice Thomas, in contrast, contends that whatever
evidence the Executive uses to ground the detention in the first place
is sufficient, and there is no need for due process or for further
involvement by the courts.6
The majority strategy might be viewed as a particular
implementation of the logic of Federalist Si: fear is subjected to a
regime in which it can be answered, and moderated by the emotions
and goals animating plural institutions. As Justices Ginsburg and
Souter point out, the Executive Branch, which is constituted so as to
be focused on national security fears, should not be solely responsible
for striking the balance between security and liberty: finding that
balance requires, as well, the participation of the Legislative Branch,
which responds to a range of popular sentiments, or the Judicial
Branch, which has an institutional connection to process and the
protection of liberty.70 Our constitutional order responds to fear-in
the style of the Framers-by creating a structure that arrays passion
71against passion.
This structural arrangement underscores a second interesting
feature of the Hamdi decision in relation to fear. Both by requiring
congressional authorization of the indefinite detention of enemy
combatants, and by equipping those detained with process through
which they can contest their enemy combatant status, the Court
assimilates the new, fear-inducing situation to familiar doctrines that
govern more quotidian circumstances. Hamdi's due process rights
are framed within the doctrine of Mathews v. Eldridge-the
administrative law balancing test that is used, for example, for
69 See id. at 595-99 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
70 Justices Ginsburg and Souter note:
The defining character of American constitutional government is its constant tension
between security and liberty, serving both by partial helpings of each. In a
government of separated powers, deciding finally on what is a reasonable degree of
guaranteed liberty whether in peace or war (or some condition in between) is not
well entrusted to the Executive Branch of Government, whose particular
responsibility is to maintain security. For reasons of inescapable human nature, the
branch of the Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on
which to rest the Nation's entire reliance in striking the balance between the will to
win and the cost in liberty on the way to victory; the responsibility for security will
naturally amplify' the claim that security legitimately raises. A reasonable balance is
more likely to be reached on the judgment of a different branch . . . . Hence the need
for an assessment by Congress before citizens are subject to lockup ..
Id. at 545 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71 Justices Souter and Ginsburg specifically cite the goal articulated in Federalist 5 1: ...the
constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a
check on the other-that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the
public rights."' Id (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 5 1, at 349 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed.,
1961)).
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deprivations of government benefits. 7 2 This conspicuous recourse to
normal science in the due process area contrasts starkly with Justice
Thomas's approach, which suggests that fear-inducing national
security developments should be handled by recourse to a more
exceptional constitutional arrangement: broad deference to the
decisions of a unitary executive.7
2. Regret
A second emotion that has become salient in recent constitutional
adjudication is regret. Chris Guthrie describes regret as "a painful
feeling we experience upon determining that we could have obtained
a better outcome if we had decided or behaved differently."7 In
contrast to fear, regret has not been a familiar affective dimension of
constitutional adjudication. Although there may be many explanations
for this divergence, two seem particularly plausible. First, as regards
the emotions of litigants or of the citizenry more generally, a focus on
regret seems ill-suited to a liberal democracy, which venerates the
ostensibly unencumbered choices of its citizens. If citizens have
been afforded the opportunity to make their choices, their second
thoughts-a reflection of their broader responsibility for those
choices-are their own business, not matters of public concern.
Second, as regards the courts' own functioning, regret is dangerously
redolent of both subjectivity and fallibility-it is premised on an
awareness of having had an opportunity to decide otherwise, and
having made a flawed or suboptimal choice.7 For legal actors
whose legitimacy has historically resided in their claims to "follow
the law" -whether it be the language of the Constitution or a
doctrinally-entrenched theory of interpretation-acknowledging
regret is a vertiginous admission of incompletely-constrained
discretion. Yet notwithstanding these weighty considerations, regret
has come to play a surprisingly prominent role in a hotly contested
area of constitutional law: the right to reproductive choice.
72 Id at 529 (plurality opinion) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
73 It also contrasts with proposals such as that made by Bruce Ackerman to shift to a
different, newly-imnprovised system of checks and balances for addressing the threats to national
security-and in particular the fear of future dangers-arising from 9/li. See Bruce Ackerman,
The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004).
74 Chris Guthrie, Carhart; Constitutional Rights, and the Psychology of Regret, 81 S. CAL.
L. Rgv. 877, 882 (2008). Guthrie's succinct definition draws on a number of works on regret by
philosophers, psychologists, and psychotherapists. See id. at 882-83 n.25 (identifying several
sources for Guthrie's concept of regret).
75 While judges or justices may sometimes argue, in dissent, that the court has made a
decision it will come to regret, such claims are most often only vehicles for arguing that the
decision itself constituted an unjustified departure from a constitutionally clear path, rather than
occasions for acknowledging the extent of discretion.
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The rhetoric of regret, in the context of abortion, began to emerge
as the advocacy strategy of pro-life organizations shifted to "woman-
centered" arguments for restricting reproductive choice.7 This
transition began with efforts such as "Operation Outcry,",7 which
solicited narratives of women who experienced regret, guilt, and
suicidal ideation following abortions. The strategy fuieled a range of
legislative initiatives, from informed consent requirements to South
Dakota's recent ballot initiative, which proposed the broadest ban on
abortion in the country.7 It received a surprising endorsement from
the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Carhart, a case which considered
the constitutionality of a federal ban on intact dilation and extraction
abortions .7 9 Noting that "[rlespect for human life finds an ultimate
expression in the bond of love the mother has for her child[,]"' 0 the
majority opinion states:
While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it
seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to
regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created
and sustained. Severe depression and loss of esteem can
follow. 81
This focus on retrospective regret became one of several bases for the
majority's decision, including concerns about whether women are
being fully informed about the procedure, and uncertainty within the
medical community about whether intact dilation and extraction is in
fact safer for women who must abort in the second trimester. The
opinion triggered a scathing dissent from Justice Ginsburg, who
76 Reva Siegel provides a thoughtful and thorough discussion of this development. See
Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective
Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. R-Ev. 991 (2007).
77 See Balldnization, The Big News About Gonzales v. Carhart-It's the Informed
Consent, Stupid, http://batkin.blogspot.com/2007/04/big-news-about-gonzales-v-carhart.htm]
(Apr. 19, 2007, 2:50 PM); Operation Outcry, http://www.operationoutcry.orgl (last visited July
8, 2009).
78 In 2008, anti-abortion activists in South Dakota introduced via ballot initiative a ban on
abortions with limited exceptions for life, health, rape, and incest. The measure banned all
abortions except for those: (1) in which the pregnancy results from rape or incest, provided the
abortion occurs prior to the end of the twentieth week of gestation (as measured from the first
day of the woman's last menstrual period ("Imp")) and the physician reports the rape or incest to
law enforcement, identify'ing the woman and the perpetrator if possible; (2) where the abortion
"is necessary to avert the death of the pregnant woman"; or (3) where the abortion "is necessary
because there is a serious risk of a substantial and irreversible impairment of the functioning
of a major bodily organ or system of the pregnant woman should the pregnancy be
continued." Initiative Petition §§ 2-7 (Nov. 4, 2008), available at http://www.sdsos.gov/
electionsvoteregistration/electvoterpdfs/2008/2008regulateperformanceofabortions.pdf
79 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
80 Id at 159.
81 Id. (citations omitted).
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called concerns about regret "an antiabortion shibboleth for which it
concededly has no reliable evidence." 82 She observed that if the Court
is concerned with women's regret about their choices, the answer is to
"require doctors to inform women, accurately and adequately, of the
different procedures and their attendant risks,"8 not to "deprive[]
women of the right to make an autonomous choice, even at the
expense of their safety.",84
Future trajectory of this line of analysis is uncertain: the South
Dakota legislation that was based explicitly on similar conclusions
regarding retrospective regret was voted down last November by a 55
percent to 45 percent margin. 85Yet this reasoning has become part of
constitutional doctrine 86 and provides a ready vehicle for courts to
question the reproductive choices of women in a potentially broad
array of contexts.8
C. Learning from the Analysis of Constitutional Emotions
In the previous section, I identified two emotions that have come
to play a significant role in the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence.
But the study of law and the emotions, as we have seen, does more
than identify the operation of emotions in various contexts of law. It
also uses research and analysis regarding the emotions, drawn from a
variety of disciplinary fields, to provide fuller understandings of those
emotions-what animates them and how they operate in particular
contexts. These understandings can then be used to interrogate,
inform, or revise legal responses. In this section, I want to look briefly
at what we have learned about the two emotions in question from
research in a number of fields, and ask what it suggests about the way
these emotions have been treated by the courts.
82 Id at 183 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 184.
84 Id
85 See Steven Ertelt, South Dakota Voters Defeat Second Ballot Measure to Ban Most
Abortions, LTFENEWS.com, Nov. 5, 2008, http://www.lifenews.con~state3619.htmlA.
86 Jack Balldn has referred to the constitutional prioritizing of post-abortion regret as "the
big news about Gonzales v. Carhart." Balldnization, The Big News About Gonzales v.
Carhart-It's the Informed Consent, Stupid, http://balkin.blogspot.coms/2007/04/big-news-
about-gonzales-v-carhart.htm] (Apr. 19, 2007, 2:50 PM).
87 One context in which it might be used to significant effect is the context of informed
consent. See Memorandum from James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson Regar-ding Pro-Life
Strategy Issues 9 (Aug. 7, 2007), available at http://www.montanacc.org/
directors..pages/PDFs/l0MarchO8lBoppMemo-re-Prolife~trategyl .pdf (advocating, inter alia,
"[a] statute requiring the woman to view ultrasound images of her unborn baby").
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1. Public Fear and the Constraints of Process
Fear, as I note above, has been studied in many ways by scholars
in fields from philosophy to neuroscience. Much of this research,
however, relates to fear as an individual phenomenon, and a response
to immediate physical danger.8 Here I'd like to focus instead on two
bodies of work that look at fear as a force in politics or policymaking,
which may have group as well as individual dynamics. First, fear has
been the subject of a major recent focus by psychologists, economic
theorists, and legal scholars interested in the field of risk assessment.
These scholars conceive emotions such as fear as prompting
departures from rationality: flawed 'heuristics' or cognitive shortcuts
that impede accurate thinking about risk. Cass Sunstein has described
some of these distinctive cognitive errors in his recent book, Laws of
Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle .8 9 Fear, Sunstein observes,
is associated with "probability nelc"9-w are particularly fearful
of events with catastrophic consequences, even if these events have a
vanishingly low probability of occurring-as well as with an
"availability heuristic, 9 1-we tend to be more afraid of developments
that recent events or exposures have made cognitively available to us,
whether or not they are likely to occur. Sunstein also observes that
fear has collective dimensions. It is one of the emotions that is subject
to contagion, producing "cascades" 92 of affect in which people who
are proximate amplify each other's anxiety. Sunstein argues that these
patterns point to the wisdom of allocating certain kinds of risk
assessment calculations to experts who are professionally socialized
to resist the kinds of heuristics that affect broad segments of the
public.93
A second body of work that focuses on more collective dimensions
of fear comes from the field of political theory.9 A recent, exemplary
88 See, e.g., LEDOUX, supra note 50; SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 35-88; Kristin A. Buss
& Elizabeth J. Kiel, Comparison of Sadness, Anger, and Fear Facial Expressions When
Toddlers Look at Their Mothers, 75 CHILD DEV. 1761 (2004); Bonnie L. Halpemn-Feisher &
Susan G. Milistein, The Effects of Terrorism on Teens'Perception of Dying 30 J. ADOLESCENT
HEALTH 308 (2002); Zajonc, supra note 50. But see ELAINE HATFIELD, JOHN T. CACIOPPO &
RICHARD L. RAPsoN, EMOTIONAL CONTAGION (1994); SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 89-106
(discussing "Fear as Wildfire"); Loewenstein & Mather, supra note 50.
89 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 11.
90 Id at 70-73.
91 Id at 69.
92 Id at 94-98.
93 See id. at 85-87 (comparing rationality of ordinary people and governments or those
reflecting on scientific information under circumstances that permit deliberation), 175-203
(making argument for "libertarian paternalism").
94 See COREY ROBIN, FEAR: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL IDEA (2004); see also
HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (new ed. 1973); Judith N. Shklar, The
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work that draws on this literature, and applies it specifically to the
context of the United States after 9/11, is Corey Robin's Fear: The
History of a Political Idea. 95 Using examples from McCarthyism
through the Rwandan genocide, Robin argues that fear does not
simply emerge in individuals, it follows well-hewn paths of
culturally-instilled belief and mythology and can be elaborately
orchestrated by public officials. 96 Robin identifies two patterns that
are salient in the ebb and flow of U.S. political history: the tendency
of the public, and its governmental leaders, to embrace fear as a
source of energy and revitalization in politics; and the tendency of
U.S. officials to depoliticize the source of fear by presenting groups
or nations against whom the American public is (to be) arrayed as
motivated by flawed psychology, rather than judgments of political
difference.9 Robin notes that while the public terror following 9/11
was widely understood to represent something entirely new on the
American political scene, it actually followed both of these patterns.9
Devastated as they were by the human costs of the attacks, Americans
seized on the possibility they presented for a kind of political rebirth,
marked by new unity and a restoration of national purpose that had
been absent since the demise of the Cold War.99 Moreover, officials
presented the al-Qa'ida threat as emanating from a psychological or
cultural rejection of modernity, rather than a political rejection of U.S.
geopolitics and political values.' 00
How might this cross-disciplinary analysis of fear help us think
about the issue framed by Hamdi? It may suggest, in the first
instance, the wisdom of the majority's reluctance to take the fear
reflected in a policy of indefinite detention at face value. The events
of 9/11 were almost ideally tailored to provoke the flawed heuristics
highlighted by Cass Sunstein: the catastrophic losses at the Twin
Towers, and at the Pentagon, and the availability of this source of
national terror-through its temporal immediacy and its constant
replay in the media, scholarship, and varied forms of cultural
Liberalism of Fear, in AMERICAN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT: A READER 179 (Andreas
Hess ed., 2003); JUDITH N. SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES (1984).
95 ROBIN, supra note 94.
96 Id. at 227-48, 142-55 (showing how cultivation of fear requires work by elites and
public officials, and how terror can function as the moral foundation for liberal democracy).
97 Id. at 142-55 (illustrating how liberal democracies can view terror as a source of
regeneration, and how they can view those who perpetrate terror as animated by psychological
anxieties about modernity).
98 Id at 155-60 (discussing how 9/11 followed both of these patterns).
99 Id
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expression-both point to distortions in the fear of another terrorist
attack, as do the collective fear "cascades" that followed the event. 10'
They also bear the marks of governmental and media orchestration
discussed by Robin: government actors-particularly those of the
Executive Branch-often characterized the War on Terror as a war
against psychological extremists and cultural opponents of modernity.
As Robin describes this governmental mindset, one can't negotiate
with such people, so the better path is simply to kill them' 02--or, one
might add, to detain them indefinitely. In this context, the checking
function made possible by the institutional participation of the
Legislative Branch (in authorizing detention) and the Judicial Branch
(in providing hearings to detainees) makes a vital contribution. Robin
reminds us that it is no panacea: he describes, for example, the way
that fear, under McCarthyism, flourished under-and even deployed
to advantage the arrangements produced by-the separation of
powers.103 But the opportunity to challenge the manifestations of fear
through institutions structured to be animated by other concerns-
courts, for example, may perceive the values of proceduralism and the
rights of those accused as more "imimediate"--provides an antidote
well worth preserving.
2. Scripting Regret
A different kind of conclusion emerges from the analysis of regret
in relation to Carhart. One of the most striking things about the
invocation of regret in Carhart is that the Court relies neither on
evidence, nor on analysis. It may be, as Terry Maroney has suggested,
that the Court views affective response as a matter of common sense:
something that everyone intuitively understands (although, as
Maroney points out, some understand differently from others).'04
However, far from simply being a matter of common sense, regret has
been and is being carefully investigated, in a variety of disciplines. 05
101 Sunstein points to the extreme anxiety provoked by the anthrax attacks that followed
9/11, which claimed very few lives and are generally thought to have been unrelated. See
SUNSTEN, supra note 11, at 84-85.
102 ROBIN, supra note 94, at 6.
103 See id. at 199.
104 Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009).
101 See, e.g., Daniel T. Gilbert, Carey K. Morewedge, Jane L. Risen & Timothy D. Wilson,
Looking Forward to Looking Backward: The Misprediction of Regret, 15 PSYCHOL. Sci. 346
(2004); Thomas Gilovich & Victoria Husted Medvec, The Experience of Regret: What, When
and Why, 102 PSYCHOL. REy. 379 (1995); Ira J. Roseman, Cynthia Wiest & Tamara S. Swartz,
Phenomenology, Behaviors, and Goals Differentiate Discrete Emotions, 67 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 206 (1994). For works specifically considering the emotion of regret in the
context of abortion, see Guthrie, supra note 74; A. Kero, U. H6gberg & A. Labos, Wellbeing and
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Much of this research calls into question the Court's treatment of
regret in Cat-hart.
To begin with the obvious, the Court marshals no empirical
support for its contention that women who abort their fetuses may
experience regret, leading to depression and loss of self-esteem.
In fact, many empirical studies of post-abortion response reach a
starkly different conclusion. They suggest that the predominant
emotion women feel, both immediately after abortions and over the
longer-term, is relief, and that few of those who do feel grief or
conflict over their choice actually regret it. 10 6 Investigations of regret
by psychologists, behavioral economists, and other social scientists
also suggest regret is far less likely to be a problem for women after
abortion than the Court suggests. Drawing on this literature in a
recent article, Chris Guthrie argues that people tend to avoid regret,
overestimate regret, dampen regret, and learn from regret. 107 These
adaptive patterns mean that people tend to experience regret less often
than one might anticipate, and that when they do they are capable of
muting its force or extracting positive experience from it.'108 These
features, as Guthrie concludes, make regret unlikely to have a
negative force in women's lives following an abortion.
Moreover, regret, like other emotions, emerges in a particular
social, political, and cultural context: we receive strong social and
cultural cues about the emotions we should feel and the objects that
should provoke them. 109 This context renders the Court's treatment of
regret additionally problematic. Regret emerges in relation to an
event, usually a choice, which the subject believes should have been
made differently." 0 In this case, however, the choice has unusual
cultural salience: it is a choice by a woman about when or whether
to become a mother. Motherhood, in most cultures, is strongly
associated with identity as a woman: even some of the women in
the Swedish abortion study, who had firmly decided to end their
pregnancies, noted that their pregnancy had caused them to feel as if
Mental Growth-Long-term Effects ofLegal Abortion, 58 J. Soc. SC. & MED. 2559 (2004).
106Kero et al., supra note 105, at 2559-60 (citing a range of studies that have found few
negative emotional effects and broad experience of satisfaction and/or relief).
107 See Guthrie, supra note 74, at 882-902.
108 See Gilovich & Medvec, supra note 105, at 387-88 (describing psychological "repair"
mechanisms that subjects apply to actions they regret).
109Cheshire Calhoun, Making Up Emotional People: The Case of Romantic Love, in THE
PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 3, at 217, 220-25.
"
50Gilovich & Medvec, supra note 105, at 380 (adopting a definition of regret as ..'a more
or less painful cognitive and emotional state of feeling sorry for misfortunes, limitations, losses,
transgressions, shortcomings, or mistakes. It is an experience of felt-reason or reasoned-
emotion." (quoting JANET LANDMAN, REGRET: THE PERSISTENCE OF THE POSSIBLE 36 (1993)).
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they had arrived at womanhood."' Femininity, in addition, is
culturally associated with caring for and protecting others,
particularly children.
All these factors mean that the choice not to become a mother, to
abort rather than nurture a fetus, is heavily socially-freighted. The fact
that, even in this setting, women are able to experience relief when
they have an abortion reflects both the great difficulties that
unexpected motherhood can impose on those not prepared to
undertake it, and the emergent social and cultural norms that define
women through roles other than mother or caregiver as agents in
control of their own lives. A view such as that ventured by the Court
can change. this subtle afetvecaculu.
Shifting this cultural balance was precisely what pro-life advocates
set out to do'"2 with vehicles such as testimonials of Operation
Outcry,"' which were submitted to the South Dakota legislature, and
to Congress during hearings on the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban." 4
Operation Outcry offered the experiences of two thousand women,
selected and compiled by advocates, who had come to regret and
suffer from their decisions to abort." 5 This intervention sought to
redefine the debate by highlighting what advocates believed was a
neglected response." 6 Yet, as they likely understood, this intervention
did not simply describe, it also scripted emotion: the combination of
experiential accounts featuring regret with theologically-infuised
accounts describing women's "natural" role as mother and nurturer" 7
sent a strong normative message to women. It reminded them what
they should feel-by virtue of biology and morality-when they
contemplate abrin 18 The Supreme Court's embrace of this view
I I See Keros et al., supra note 105, at 2562.
"12 Reva Siegel offers an excellent account of this campaign, as led by activist David
Readon and organizations such as the Elliot Institute. See Siegel, supra note 76, at 1017- 30.
113 "OPERATION OUTCRY is the project of THE JUSTICE FOUNDATION to end legal
abortion by exposing the truth about its devastating impact on women, men and families."
Operation Outcry, About Us, http://www.operationoutcry.org/pages.asp?pageid-27784 (last
visited June 12, 2009). The Justice Foundation offers pro bono legal support for the litigation of
conservative political issues.
114 Similar testimonials were provided to the Court in Carhart through the Brief of Sandra
Cano, supra note 46 (brief supported by some 180 "post-abortive" women who offered close to
100 pages of testimony on their experiences).
115 See Siegel, supra note 76, at 1026-27 (reporting that Operation Outcry compiled and
supplied to the legislature of South Dakota the statements of 2000 women who had come to
regret their decision to abort).
116 See id. at 10 18-2 1.
117 See id. at 10 19- 21.
11 na forthcoming article, Clare Huntington makes a similar point about woman-centered
anti-abortion arguments; however, she frames it in slightly different terms, arguing that the
activists who advanced this rhetoric and the legal actors who adopted it used emotions to
(re)construct social norms in relation to abortion. See Clare Huntington, Family Law's Textures:
20091 593
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in Carhart provided a potent reinforcement of that script. The social
and political significance of the Court's concern about women's
regret is also underscored by the remedy they provide. As Justice
Ginsburg notes in dissent, the proper response to concerns about
regret in decisionmaking is to insure that the choice in question is as
well-informed as possible. 19 Yet in Carhart, the Court responds by
circumscribing the choice itself: although the restriction concerns
only intact dilation and extraction abortions, the breadth of the
Court's concern about regret could inform broader restrictions. The
fact that the Court responds to the possibility of regret by restricting
the domain of women's choices-and the fact that women's rights to
reproductive choice stand alone as the only rights whose exercise
courts are prepared to second-guess-undermines emergent
conceptions of women as actors and decisionmakers.
CONCLUSION: AFFECTIVE ANALYSIS AND THE CONSTITUTION
In conclusion I'd like to step back and think about the arguments
for pursuing constitutional law in this particular way. I said at the
outset that I was going to pair a recent theoretical interest of mine
with the doctrinal field that Mel Durchslag and I share in common.
But it is more, I think, than grasping a theoretical hammer and seeing
everything, including constitutional law, as a nail. There are real
advantages for thinking about constitutional law, in particular, in the
ways that I've tried to elaborate, and I want to finish by offering a few
of them.
The first of these additional benefits is epistemological. Exposing
the role that emotions play, in general, helps us to resist the more
unqualified versions of the claim that law is the domain of detached
or disembodied reason. Highlighting the role of the emotions reminds
us of the important realist lesson that judges are always, inevitably,
contending with their own sometimes unruly passions. It also
underscores the insight of critical scholars such as Martha Minow and
Social Norms, Emotion and the State, 5 9 EMORY L. REv. (forthcoming 20 10).
119 Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 184 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Some
interventions by pro-life advocates have reflected this insight, using women's regret to ground
the imposition of additional "informed consent" warnings which must be administered prior
to an abortion. An informed consent statute supported by David Reardon was submitted
to the legislature in South Dakota, but later tabled in favor of the ban statute. See SOUTH
DAKOTA BILL HISTORY REPORT 73 (2006), available at http://Iegis.state.sd.us/sessions/
2006/billstatus.pdf (reporting history of House Bill 1216, "An Act to define the applicable
standard of care in regard to screening of risk factors for all abortions except in the case of a
medical emergency, to provide civil remedies, and to exempt medical emergencies from the
requirements of this Act."); see also Siegel, supra note 76, at 1027.
594 Vol. 59:3
2009] EXPLORING THE AFFECTIVE CONSTITUTION59
Robert Cover that judges who aren't aware of their own affective
responses can underestimate the normative significance of the cases
they're deciding, and judges who fail to understand the affective
significance of cases for litigants can fail to take responsibility for the
impact of their decisions on the lives of others. 120 Cover framed this
issue poignantly in his study of judges adjudicating the Fugitive Slave
Act, whose ability to distance themselves from the lives of the people
before them also permitted them to distance themselves from their
own moral intuitions about the institution of slavery.'12'1 These insights
aren't unique to the constitutional area, but there are particular
advantages to acknowledging the role of emotion here, because
the claims of dispassion and objectivity are particularly prornincnt,
even exaggerated, in this area.'122 To take them on here is truly to
expose the pervasiveness of emotion in law, and to give us a more
multi-dimensional view of the process of legal decisionmnaking.
Second, affective questions are operating potently in many kinds
of constitutional cases: they may precipitate or infuse the conflict (as
in the case of fear in Hamdi); they may be engaged directly on the
face of the doctrine (as in Carhart). If we fail to acknowledge
them, or we analyze them partially yet miss important features or
implications of the emotions at stake, we risk rendering flawed
opinions-just as we would if we failed to take account of all the
facts, or failed fully to parse the applicable precedent. Part of this
understanding is appreciating emotions as social phenomena: what
have we learned about how fear operates in groups, or how it may be
managed or controlled? Are there reasons that it is easier for legal
actors to advert to fear, guilt, or regret when they are experienced by
women, particularly mothers, than by other members of the polity?
These issues are operating in and around many of the most salient
constitutional issues of the day: law and emotions analysis does not
import them into constitutional law; it gives us tools for handling,
thoughtfully and responsibly, what is already there.
Finally, acknowledging and analyzing the affective dimensions of
constitutional cases and constitutional decisionmaking becomes
crucial as we begin to see the field extending beyond the work of
120 Minow & Spelman, supra note 6, at 48 (citing ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED:
ANTI-SLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975)); see also Henderson, supra note 6, at 1590-
91 (same).
121 See COVER, supra note 120.
122 The confirmation hearings for Justice Sonia Sotomayor, which were marked by acute
anxieties on the part of several Senators about the threat to objectivity implied by the nominee's
"wise Latmna" remarks, provided a vivid illustration of this tendency. See Kathryn Abrams,
Empathy and Emotion in the Sotomayor Hearings (Oct. 1, 2009) (manuscript on file with
author).
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courts to various forms of popular constitutionalism. Here, scholars
are coming to recognize what has, from the founding to the Civil
War, through the Great Depression to the civil rights struggle, been
a major pattern in American constitutionalism: the complicated
engagements between courts, democratic institutions, and members
of a mobilized public. Those who approach the law not as
institutionally-defined experts, but as citizens, who have not been
socialized to resist or abstract from affective response, engage
constitutional issues not only (or even primarily) doctrinally, but in
terms of the deep, only semi-rationalized feeling states they generate.
Hamd& was about the process due a citizen detained as an enemy
combatant, but it was also about how the institutions that comprise
our system of government should respond to the fear generated by
an unanticipated and unprecedented vulnerability to terror.
Many people understand these decisions in affective terms that the
Court acknowledges mainly in moments of crisis or transformation.
Emotions form the context, the content, and the stakes of
constitutional decisionmaking-perhaps particularly at a complicated
moment when so many of our constitutional precepts, from equal
protection, to reproductive rights, to national security, and the system
of checks and balances, seem to be up for grabs. If we, as legal
commentators and actors, fail to understand the affective ways these
cases are conceived by the people who live under our Constitution,
we risk having a court system, and a body of doctrine, that is isolated
from and unaccountable to the people who live under it. As
paradoxical as it may sound, encouraging decisionmakers to explore
the affective dimensions of the Constitution may be essential to the
Court's ongoing legitimacy.
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